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United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and 
Others (CCT89/17) [2017] ZACC 21 
Tinenenji Banda 
The Facts 
On 31 March 2017, South African President Jacob Zuma, in exercise of his 
constitutional powers, dismissed the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, 
and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas. The South African market reacted sharply to 
these dismissals, and an economic downgrade to junk status took effect 
shortly thereafter. In light of the economic downgrade, three opposition 
political parties, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Democratic 
Alliance, and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) approached the 
Speaker of the National Assembly Baleka Mbete, requesting her to schedule 
a motion of no confidence in President Zuma. Mbete obliged, and scheduled 
the motion for the 18 April 2017. 
 
Twelve days before the motion was to be tabled, the UDM wrote a letter to 
Mbete, asking that she mandate a secret ballot for the motion. In support of 
this request, the UDM asserted that the motion was of obviously high 
importance, and that the public interest necessitated the guarantee of a truly 
“democratic outcome”, which could only be achieved, it was argued, 
through a secret ballot. An open ballot would in the UDM’s view, limit the 
free will of members, since some members of the House, fearing career 
reprisals and other adverse repercussions, might be intimidated into voting 
against the motion. 
 
In responding to the request, Mbete proffered that neither the Constitution 
nor the Rules of the National Assembly made provision for the prescribing 
of a secret ballot for a motion of no confidence vote. In arriving at her 
decision, she relied on the 2015 High Court Decision of Tlouamma v 
Speaker of the National Assembly. In Tloumanna, the High Court had held 
that the South African Constitution did not expressly or impliedly require a 
secret ballot for motions of no confidence in the President. On the strength 
of that case, and based on her interpretation of the Constitution and the 
National Assembly Rules, the Speaker concluded that she lacked the legal 
authority to prescribe a secret ballot for the motion. 
 
Unpersuaded by the Speaker’s reasoning, the UDM petitioned the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa to determine whether the Constitution 
of the Republic and the Rules of the National Assembly did in fact bar the 
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Speaker from prescribing a secret ballot for a motion of no confidence in the 
President. If it was to be the Court’s finding that the Speaker was not so 
proscribed, the UDM asked the court to mandate the Speaker to prescribe a 
secret ballot for the no confidence motion.  
 
The Holding 
The elegant, unanimous judgment, was delivered by Chief Justice Mogoeng 
Mogoeng. Justice Mogoeng began his judgment by underscoring the fact 
that as a constitutional democracy, the South African government was a 
government “of the people, by the people and for the people”. He added that 
since constitutional democracies do not self-actualize, it was the 
responsibility of governmental institutions and structures to turn the 
aspirations of the people into a reality. Noting that fifty five million people 
cannot collectively govern the Republic, he acknowledged that governance 
“by the people” was a legal fiction, noting further that the impracticalities of 
collective governance compelled the people to assign governance functions 
to “servants” and “messengers” who, in the exercise of these functions, 
should have the welfare of all South Africans foremost in mind.  
 
Justice Mogoeng then went on to observe that because public officials wield 
so much power, these agents must have an unwavering loyalty to the 
constitutional values of accountability and openness, and that those values 
were in part superintended by Parliament, to whom the President, Deputy 
President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers were enjoined to report. The 
responsibility of supervising the performance of the President and his 
cabinet, the Chief Justice pronounced, fell squarely on the National 
Assembly. Parliament’s oversight function, according to the Court, was to 
ensure that the power and resources entrusted to the executive were used in 
a justifiable way. 
 
The Court proceeded to suggest that there might come a time when “all the 
regular checks and balances seem to be ineffective”, and that at such a time, 
the best interests of the nation may require resort to the use of the “ultimate 
accountability ensuring mechanisms” of which there are three: (i) the 
removal of office through the ballot box; (ii) ‘impeachment’; and (iii) a 
successful motion of no confidence. The threat of these mechanisms and 
their severe repercussions, the Court opined, were intended to serve as 
constant reminders to the President and his cabinet, that mishandling of 
public power and resources might inflict severe repercussions on those who 
so offend. 
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As to Parliament’s specific oversight responsibilities, the Chief Justice 
focused on section 55(1) of the Constitution, which provides that: 
The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms 
(a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere 
of government are accountable to it; and 
(b) to maintain oversight of— 
(i) the exercise of national executive authority, including the 
implementation of legislation; and  
(ii) any organ of state. 
 
In specific reference to motions of no confidence, Mogoeng went on to cite 
Section 102 of the Constitution, which declares: 
(1) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its 
members, passes a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet excluding 
the President, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.  
(2) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its 
members, passes a motion of no confidence in the President, the 
President and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy 
Ministers must resign.  
 
Reiterating the severity of a motion of no confidence, the Chief Justice 
emphasized that a successful no confidence vote in the President was the 
most severe sanction that Parliament could impose on a sitting President, 
and as such, was the outer limit of Parliament’s supervisory function.  
 
The Court then went on to decide the question that triggered the case, 
namely, whether the Speaker of the National Assembly has power to 
prescribe a secret ballot. The Court noted that in light of section 57 which 
empowers the National Assembly to determine its own procedures and 
arrangements, the Constitution’s failure to prescribe the conduct of a no 
confidence vote was deliberate. The Court held further that Parliament’s 
freedom in this regard was limited only by the requirement that whatever 
rules and procedures Parliament puts in place, must support, in the Chief 
Justice’s own words, the advancing of the “constitutional project.”  
 
The Court then examined the National Assembly Rules, focusing in 
particular on rule 104(1), which empowers the Speaker to prescribe the 
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voting procedure that must be used when a manual voting system is used. 
The import of Rule 104, the Court held, is that the procedure that the 
Speaker prescribes, will determine if a vote is conducted by secret ballot or 
not. In other words, the question of whether voting is conducted by secret or 
open ballot, is a discretionary decision that the Rules of Parliament 
empower the Speaker to make. In making this judgment call, the Court held 
that the Speaker should be guided by the outcome which best ensures that 
“members exercise their oversight powers most effectively.” Ultimately, the 
Court ruled, the Speaker was labouring under a misapprehension when she 
determined that she lacked the power to prescribe a secret vote.  
 
After disposing of the first question, the Court then went on to determine 
the second issue: namely, whether the Court could compel the Speaker to 
prescribe a secret ballot for the no confidence vote against the President. 
The Court held that compelling the Speaker to prescribe a particular voting 
procedure would violate the separation of powers principle, since this is a 
power entrusted only to the Speaker, and the Speaker alone. The Court 
therefore left the decision of whether the motion of no confidence vote 
should be held by secret or open ballot in the hands of the Speaker.  
 
Significance  
In holding that the Speaker did in fact have the power to prescribe voting 
procedures, the Court, in one fell swoop, exercised a decisive check on both 
Parliament and the Executive. For Parliament, the check came in the form 
of this reminder: the supervisory powers bestowed on Parliament by the 
Republican Constitution, are not to be hollow and unrealizable. Instead, 
procedures that ensure that the “ultimate accountability ensuring 
mechanisms” can in fact actualize, should be put in place by those 
responsible for doing so. In this respect, the Court reminded the Speaker 
that the South African Constitution and the Rules of the National Assembly 
empower her to prescribe procedures that best enable Parliament to realize 
its oversight responsibility.  
 
For the Executive, the check came in the form of this caution: when 
ordinary checks and balances fail to reign them in, the most fatal of 
sanctions will wield a lethal sword to curtail the abuse.  
 
Of particular significance is the fact that even while acting as a check on 
others, the Court acknowledged that it too was constrained, and was 
therefore careful not to overstep its own boundaries. While the Court 
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stopped short of impinging on the domain of the Speaker, the Court did 
offer significant guidance on how the Speaker must go about determining 
parliamentary voting procedure, holding in part that: “[t]here must always 
be a proper and rational basis for whatever choice the Speaker makes in the 
exercise of the constitutional power to determine the voting procedure” and 
further that “[d]ue regard must always be had to real possibilities of 
corruption as well as [whether] the prevailing circumstances…allow 
Members to exercise their vote in a manner that does not expose them to 
illegitimate hardships.” The Speaker, the Court held, must have regard to 
the prevailing atmosphere in Parliament, and whether the atmosphere is 
“peaceful”, “toxified’ or “highly charged”, should all be relevant inputs in 
the decision-making process.  
 
In UDM v the Speaker, the Court displayed in full force and with expert 
precision, the important oversight function that the judiciary plays in a 
constitutional democracy. While the primary recipient of that oversight 
function in this particular case was Parliament, the Executive was both 
cautioned and reminded, that when exercised on behalf of the people, public 
power must be exercised in a judicious, controlled, and justifiable manner.  
 
